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FOREWORD 
Formally established as a separate entity in late 1996, IDRC's Peacebuilding and Reconstruction 
Program Initiative (PBR PI) supports research, policy development and capacity building as tools 
to assist countries emerging from violent conflicts to make the difficult transition to peace, 
reconciliation, social equity and sustainable development. Among IDRC's programs, the PBR PI 
is distinctive in two key respects: first, because it focuses specifically on the developmental 
challenges of post-conflict societies, and second, because its programming approach is designed to 
contribute actively to the process of peacebuilding and reconstruction. The program initiative 
supports a wide range of research projects at the national, regional and global levels. 
The unique and fluid nature of the research and development problematique in post-conflict societies 
requires a programming approach which is highly responsive and reflexive to changing contexts. 
With the end of the Cold War, local wars and intra-state armed conflicts have come to centre-stage 
in international affairs, and the international community can no longer approach the twin issues of 
peace and development in a fragmented fashion. New conceptual and methodological tools are 
urgently required to understand and respond to the precarious and fragile political, economic, and 
social environments found in conflict-torn countries. Policy and practice must be informed by 
lessons drawn from the field as well as new analytical approaches. 
The PBR PI's Working Paper series is intended to stimulate creative and critical thinking about 
practice and research undertaken in the field of peacebuilding and reconstruction by diverse actors 
involved in post-conflict settings . The papers that appear in the series should be viewed as dynamic 
works in progress, designed to provoke discussion and dialogue. 
A Measure of Peace. Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment of Development Projects in Conflict 
Zones is an excellent piece to launch the Working Paper series in that it examines the critical 
linkages between peace/conflict and development. Peacebuilding, the paper argues, should not be 
regarded as a specific activity but as an impact. There is, therefore, a tremendous need to avoid 
"ghettoizing" peacebuilding as a type of project separate from "conventional" development. Rather, 
all development activities (especially those in environments of potential conflict) should be assessed 
in terms of their peace and conflict impact. While Kenneth Bush identifies a number of important 
questions which may lead to a formal "tool" for peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA), he 
exemplifies the spirit of this Working Paper series by acknowledging that developing such a tool 
"will have to be the product of the interaction and synergies of the full spectrum of the peacebuilding 
community." 
The Peacebuilding and Reconstruction 




This Working Paper is part of a study commissioned by the Evaluation Unit of the International 
Development Research Centre. I owe a deep debt of gratitude to the Unit for providing me with the 
opportunity to wrestle with some of the central conceptual issues involved in the development of a 
peace and conflict impact assessment tool, and to test out these ideas through a field trip to IDRC- 
supported projects in Uganda, South Africa, and Mozambique. The study benefited greatly from the 
intellectual support of the newly created "Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Program Initiative" of 
IDRC both in Ottawa and in Johannesburg. In attempting to further our understanding of the 
interconnections between development, peace, and conflict, and to fashion a workable assessment 
tool, this study builds on earlier research commissioned for the OECD DAC Task Force on Conflict, 
Peace, and Development Cooperation by the Policy Branch of the Canadian International 
Development Agency.' 
There are many individuals who contributed to the development of the ideas presented in this report. 
In North America, this includes: Todd Baseden, Fred Carden, Celine Corsius, Chris Cushing, Denise 
Deby. Milton Esman. Tracey Goodman, Bob Fraser. Kerry Buck, Hunter McGill, the Canadian 
Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, Rob Opp, Calvin Piggott, Cerstin Sander, Terry Smutylo, 
Necla Tschirgi, and Norm Uphoff. In South Africa, this includes: Marc Van Ameringen, Gavin 
Caw-thra, Jacklyn Cock, Jabu Dada, Brandon Hamber. Doug Hindson, Adele Kirsten, Hartmut 
Krugmann, Penny Mckenzie, Mike Morris, Nancy Smyth. and Sue Wixley. In Mozambique: 
Miguel de Brito, Lisa Campeau, Noel Chicuacua, Carlos Henriques, Kate Horn, Douglas Mason, 
Ambassador Helena Odmark. Elisa dos Santos, Carlos Serra, Marc De Tollenaere, Jennifer 
Topping. and Bernhard Weimer. In Uganda: Sam Aisu. J.J. Barya, Francois Farah, Sam 
Kayabwe, Frank Muhereza, Ms. Stella Neema, Bazaara Nyangabyaki, Tom Geoffrey Omach, 
Rosalba Oywa, and John Ssenkumba. Gizaw Shibru of the Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief 
(CPAR) was especially helpful during my trip to Uganda. In Geneva: Matthias Stiefel, Agneta 
Johannsen, Martin Doornbos, and Otto Denes. 
The various contributions of these individuals have contributed significantly to the ideas developed 
in this paper. However, I alone am responsible for the contents. The views expressed here are mine 
and do not necessarily reflect those of the International Development Research Centre. 
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PREFACE 
Ten years ago, James Rule observed that "we know a lot of things to be true about civil violence, but 
we do not know when they will be true."2 We are faced with a similar condition of uncertainty when 
we turn our attention to the positive and negative impacts of development work in violence prone 
settings. Even an extensive list of positive peacebuilding impacts is not especially useful - unless 
accompanied by an equally extensive list of negative peacebuilding impacts and most importantly 
the conditions under which these "truths" held true.' Once we have such information we are in a 
better position to determine whether our efforts and interventions in a particular case are 
generalizable or applicable to other cases. Maybe they are. Maybe they are not. For example, what 
lessons should we cull from experiences in South Africa? Or Mozambique? Or Guatemala? Or Sri 
Lanka? To what extent is the present the result of unique conditions or idiosyncratic events, rather 
than structures and processes that are evident or replicable elsewhere? Until we have the analytical 
and programming tools to answer these kinds of questions systematically, we are left to list, assert, 
or guess at the positive or negative impact of our actions. 
This Working Paper is intended to be a contribution to the development of a more systematic and 
self-conscious means of assessing approaches to development work in violence prone regions. It 
is a work in progress - with all the consequent advantages and disadvantages of this format. Having 
been written by a "recovering academic," its strength and its weakness is an emphasis on the 
analytical dimensions of the assessment process. While it draws on interviews and experiences in 
the field, it is hoped that its circulation more broadly among the community of practitioners and 
policy makers will elicit (or provoke) inputs and insights from the immediate realities and 
requirements of their work environments. The next iteration of this study will integrate these various 
contributions, and be cast in a more user-friendly handbook for use by development workers. 
To fashion a Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) framework, it is essential that we have 
a sense of what might be called the basic grammar of peace and conflict impact. In an effort to 
streamline this paper, the discussion of the "basics of peacebuilding" has been consigned to the 
Appendix. Readers with an interest in reviewing some. of the central reference points in the evolving 
debate on peacebuilding may find it useful to begin their reading of the paper at the appendix. 
This study does not seek to develop the definitive evaluation tool for assessing or anticipating the 
impact of development projects on the peace and conflict environment within which they are set. 
The uniqueness of each project and the fluidity of their environments conspire to frustrate attempts 
to impose a rigidly uniform framework. Rather, this study develops an approach to guide our 
interpretation and assessment of the impact of the widest range of development projects in a more 
systematic manner than is currently the case. At this early stage in our efforts to develop a clearer 
understanding of the nexus between development, underdevelopment, violent conflict, and peace, 
this study is a call for more self-consciousness in the formulation, implementation and evaluation 
of our development initiatives in regions characterized by potential, latent, or manifest violence. 
PCIA is meant to empower individuals and institutions both to understand better their work, and, 
more importantly, to induce the changes necessary to amplify the positive impacts and to minimize 
negative impacts on the peace and conflict environment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Researchers and development workers are well aware of the limitations imposed on their work by 
the ebb and flow of violence in conflict-prone regions. However, we are only slowly turning our 
attention towards the systematic consideration and measurement of the impact of our development 
work on the dynamics of peace and conflict. Not only has it become clear that development does 
not necessarily "equal peace," but often "development" may generate or exacerbate violent conflict 
(e.g., by challenging traditional values or authority structures, by raising the stakes of economic 
competition, by creating "winners" and "losers," and so on). Conversely, development projects may 
have positive peacebuilding impacts which are unintended, and thus undocumented and unable to 
inform future development work.' 
To the extent that assessments of peace and conflict impact are undertaken, they tend to generate 
what are euphemistically called "lessons learned."5 However, sometimes the "wrong" lessons are 
culled from these experiences, and often it is more accurate to speak of "lessons spurned" rather than 
lessons learned.' One thing is clear: to the extent that learning occurs and is reflected in our 
thinking and programming, the costs are borne disproportionately by those in the South rather than 
the North. Furthermore, it is increasingly evident that there is a pressing need to move beyond ad 
hoc approaches to the assessment of the peace and conflict impact of development work in violence- 
prone regions. There is a need to develop more systematic mechanisms to both anticipate and assess 
such impact. 
This study seeks to develop an argument and framework for the systematic consideration of the 
positive and negative impacts of development projects in conflict-prone regions. Its approach is 
premised on the belief that the incorporation of peace and conflict issues into the formulation, 
implementation and evaluation of development projects is best undertaken through a process 
analogous to that used to introduce gender and the environment into mainstream development 
thinking and practice. Until we developed the analytical 
and evaluation tools to assess the impact of our It is quite possible that a project may 
development work on gender relations and the fail according to limited developmental 
environment, our understandings of linkages and impact criteria but succeed according to 
were only impressionistic - and thus non-cumulative. broader peacebuilding criteria ... It is 
Hence, our understandings of these particular dimensions [also] possible that a project may 
succeed according to pre-determined 
of development work did not cohere in a body of policy- developmental criteria but fail in terms 
relevant knowledge because of the difficulties of of a beneficial impact on peace. 
comparing and refining understandings across cases in 
different sectors and geographical regions. 
The integration of peace and conflict concerns into our development thinking calls for the 
construction of the conceptual and evaluation tools that may be applied to the full range of 
development activities in conflict-prone regions, from traditional development projects in 
agriculture, communications, and health, to more overtly political projects in "good governance." 
democratic development. and human rights. Because the means required to anticipate the impact 
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of a project or programme, are different from those suitable for assessing impact, we must consider 
both pre-project and post-project dimensions of potential and past impact. 
PART I: THE LOGIC OF PCIA 
What is a PCIA? 
Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment is a means of evaluating (ex post facto) and anticipating (ex 
ante, as far as possible) the impacts of proposed and completed development projects on: 1) those 
structures and processes which strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and decrease the 
likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence, or continuation, of violent conflict, and; 2) those structures 
and processes that increase the likelihood that conflict will be dealt with through violent means. 
Where necessary, ex ante assessments of projects should consider alternative project designs 
(including the "no-action" alternative), as well as mitigation measures or "peace and conflict 
safeguards" that could be incorporated into a project's design to offset potentially adverse impacts. 
The assessment would be most useful when initiated at the earliest stage of project design to ensure 
from the outset that aid projects are sound and sustainable.' 
The peace and conflict impact assessment of development projects differs from "evaluation" in the 
conventional sense because its scope extends far beyond the stated outputs, outcomes, goals and 
objectives of conventional development projects or programmes. Rather, it attempts to discern a 
project's impact on the peace and conflict environment - an area it may not have been designed 
explicitly to affect. Thus, it is quite possible that a project may fail according to limited 
developmental criteria (e.g., irrigation targets, health care delivery, literacy levels) but succeed 
according to broader peacebuilding criteria. For example, an education project may fail to produce 
students able to pass state-wide exams, but may succeed in reducing tensions between particular 
social groups by creating and institutionalizing a non-threatening and constructive environment that 
increases neutral contact and decreases misunderstanding by dispelling stereotypes and 
misconceptions! Unless there is a sensitivity to the peacebuilding and social reconstruction 
achievements of this hypothetical project, then it would be cast as a failure. The converse also holds 
true. It is possible that a project may succeed according to pre-determined developmental criteria 
but fail in terms of a beneficial impact on peace. To continue with the hypothetical example above: 
an education project may indeed succeed in increasing the number of students passing the state-wide 
examinations, however, if the bulk of those students are members of one particular social group, then 
the project may exacerbate inter-group tensions by underscoring the perception that one group is 
being privileged at the expense of another. Until we develop and apply the appropriate means to 
recognize such impact, our ability to understand (let alone reinforce) the positive linkages between 
development initiatives and peacebuilding will be hampered. 
At the most elemental level, both the ex ante peace and conflict impact assessment and the ex post 
facto peace and conflict impact evaluation, may be distilled down to a single - but far from simple - 
question: 
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Will/did the project foster or support sustainable structures and processes 
which strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and decrease to 
likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence, or continuation of violent conflict? 
To respond to this question, we must have an idea about where to look for possible impact; we must 
have a sense of the structures and processes that sustain peacebuilding or peace destroying systems. 
As noted above, this requires us to look beyond the stated 
parameter of most projects. This study identifies five 
broad dimensions or categories of possible impact. While 
there may be others, these five are judged to be the most 
immediate and important pieces of the peacebuilding 
puzzle. Projects may have a variety of impacts within 
and across categories. The final section of this paper will 
present a more detailed discussion of these areas of 
impact. 
Why do we need a PCIA? 
Areas of Potential Impact 
Institutional Capacity 
Military and Human Security 
Political Structures and Processes 
Economic Structures and Processes 
Social Reconstruction and 
Empowerment 
This study is premised on a central, underpinning assumption: any development project set in a 
conflict-prone region will inevitably have an impact on the peace and conflict environment - positive 
or negative, direct or indirect, intentional or unintentional. The operational implication of this is that 
not all development projects require peace and conflict impact assessments, only those in areas "at 
risk." In very practical terms, any development worker9 active in these areas already conducts his 
or her own peace and conflict impact assessment intuitively. However, there is a need to formalize 
and systematize this process in order to be able to compare risk and impact across projects. The 
costs of not doing so are extremely high in financial, institutional, programming, and most 
importantly, human, terms. 10 The benefit is that it will enable us to "do" our development work more 
effectively and sustainably. It should help us to avoid undertaking development projects which 
undercut the peacebuilding process. For example, the consideration of the peace and conflict 
dimensions of a proposed project or programme helps us to consider whether it might contribute 
directly or indirectly to the violation of internationally accepted conventions governing human and 
Not all development 
projects require 
peace and conflict 
Impact assessment, 
only those in areas 




undertake a PCIA is 
the location of a 
project, rather than 
the type of project. 
civil rights." 
The need to fashion and employ some form of PCIA is sharpened by the fact 
that: 1) we are seeing increased opportunities to contribute to the 
developmental dimensions of peacebuilding as a number of long-standing 
militarized conflicts appear to be winding down (e.g., Mozambique, Eritrea, 
South Africa, Guatemala. and Palestine) and; 2) development actors are 
choosing to stay and work under conditions of militarized conflict that 
previously would have forced them to close down operations. The continued 
presence of development actors under such conditions is important in its own 
right. However, their continued presence also helps to build operational and 
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institutional linkages between humanitarian work driven by the imperative of responsiveness, and 
development work which places a priority on national and local capacity-building. 
For whom is the PCIA intended? 
Ideally, a PCIA would be used by all development actors involved in decision making in conflict- 
prone regions - although different types of actors might rely on it in different ways. International 
donors might rely on it to guide project selection, funding decisions, and monitoring, whereas 
implementing or operational agencies might well use it to design projects and to guide operational 
decisions. The PCIA may also be used by communities themselves within violence prone regions 
as a means of assessing the utility, relevance and efficacy of outside-sponsored development 
initiatives. Thus, it may serve to enable them to engage more effectively with formal development 
actors in the peacebuilding process by providing a common framework for dialogue and cooperation. 
There is a clear danger that communities may be excluded from international development initiatives 
in post-conflict settings (particularly large scale initiatives). This is certainly the assessment of a 
group of community-based organizations in the San Marcos region of Guatemala on the border with 
Chiapas which published a statement in the national press expressing concern that current initiatives 
are exacerbating existing "socio-economic contradictions" - some of which originate in the era of 
militarized violence of Guatemala, and some of which predate it. 12 The PCIA might be employed 
by such groups as one means to articulate interests and to express dissent when confronted with 
efforts to impose inappropriate development projects. 
When and where should it be applied? 
We need to be clear about when and where it would be appropriate to undertake a PCIA. It would 
be burdensome, unnecessary, and perhaps counter-productive, to expect PCIAs for all projects. If 
we understand peacebuilding to be an impact rather than a type of project,' then the central criterion 
for determining whether to consider undertaking a PCIA is the location of a project, rather than the 
type of project. If a project will be located in environments characterized by the following 
conditions, then we ought to consider whether or not a full Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment 
may be necessary. Ultimately, the decision boils down to the judgement of the development workers 
involved, based on their understanding of past and evolving conditions within which a project is 
situated. 
Settings characterized by latent or manifest violent conflict (particularly in the so-called 
"post-conflict" or "transition" settings) 
The phrase "settings characterized by latent or manifest violent conflict" covers a staggeringly large 
range of cases. At first glance, it appears easier to identify those environments "characterized by 
manifest violent conflict" than those characterized by "latent violence." A list of cases of manifest 
violence would include both those that appear regularly in the pages of our newspapers (Algeria, 
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Bosnia. the Great Lakes Region), as well as those that are less evident in the media (Sudan, Northern 
Sri Lanka. Northern Uganda, Eastern Turkey). A list of examples of latent violence might include 
Northern Ireland, South Africa. Mozambique. and Kenya. Typically, these are areas which are at 
risk of sliding back into the protracted militarized violence of the recent past. While violence may 
not be as pervasive or systematic as it once was in these cases, the structures which nurtured such 
violence in the past remain present and liable to explode suddenly. 
Even this short list of countries above suggests a number of 
essential points about the nature of violent conflict: 1) the 
considerable variation between cases, (for example, differences in 
the levels, patterns, dispersion, intensity, and dynamics of violence, 
as well as variations in group impact); and 2) the ebb and flow of 
violent conflict over time within cases, so that conflicts in the 
"latent" category today, may well shift to the "manifest" category 
tomorrow (e.g., Cambodia). Equally important, though perhaps 
It is the variations of violence 
within cases (across time, 
and across space) that opens 
up the possibilities for 
development projects to have 
constructive peacebuilding 
\impacts. 
less apparent if we rely too heavily on media reports. is the variation in peace and conflict conditions 
that exists within each of these cases at any given point in time. In Uganda and Sri Lanka for 
example, we see a rigidly compartmentalized form of militarized conflict, where large military 
operations and intensive fighting are spatially concentrated in the northern regions of each country. 
In such cases, the line or interface between the war zone and non-war zone is sharp (the Nile River 
in Uganda. and until recently, Vavunya in Sri Lanka).' In other cases, conditions within conflict 
zones may vary depending on time of day, day of week, or the season." It is the variations of 
violence within cases (across time, and across space) that opens up the possibilities for development 
projects to have constructive peacebuilding impacts. In other words, even in the most extreme cases, 
violence is neither undifferentiated nor impenetrable. 
Territory which is contested or politically and legally ambiguous 
Like the condition above, the phrase "territory which is contested or politically and legally 
ambiguous" requires elaboration. In violent conflicts, geography is unavoidably politicized. The 
fact that the individual and community experience of violence is rooted in place - where one is from, 
where one is living, where one was taken to. 
where an event took place. Collective Collective experiences of violence serve to 
experiences of violence serve to inscribe or burn inscribe or burn political significance and 
political significance and meaning onto and into meaning onto and into the physical landscape. 
the physical landscape. In some cases the 
political sensitivities (or political "valence") of a particular location may not be immediately obvious 
to the outside observer, for example the site of a particular atrocity or a neighbourhood known for 
its resistence to, or allegiance to, particular political-military forces. Such political demarcations 
create areas which become sites for social, political, and economic contestation. Social contestation 
would include ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, eastern Sri Lanka, and elsewhere. Political 
contestation would include the deadly confrontations for control over neighbourhoods between 
African National Congress (ANC) supporters and those of Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) which 
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dominated many of the townships surrounding Durban, South Africa, in the late 1980s. Economic 
contestation would include the competition between military and paramilitary groups to benefit 
economically from their control of a particular regions, e.g., the battles for control over natural 
resources and drug trafficking in the border areas of Thailand and Cambodia, and the "taxing" of 
inhabitants by paramilitaries around the world from Belfast to Jaffna. 
Additionally, territory may by contested legally, for example over the question of the ownership of, 
or access to, land and the resources associated with that land. This includes the whole question of 
land tenure and the possible tensions between the interests of government, business, and small scale 
farmers. In some instances, land may be contested both politically and legally, as in parts of 
Palestine, and large tracts of land in North American claimed by aboriginal peoples and the 
governments of Canada and the United States. 
PART II: PRE-PROJECT CONSIDERATIONS (Assessment of Environmental Factors: 
To Go In or Not to Go In?) 
ConsidaXons for Initiating a Project in a Conflict-Prone Region 
Before a project proposal is assessed with an eye to its potential positive or negative peacebuilding 
impacts, it is necessary to undertake a preliminary review of the conditions within which the 
prospective project will be set. This is a basic process of risk assessment intended to develop a 
sense of the possible impact of the conflict environment on the project. The results of this 
assessment may lead to changes in the timing, structure, or objectives of a project; or it may suggest 
the postponement of a project until conditions improve. Alternatively, in the event that the 
conditions are considered to be at least minimally acceptable in terms of risk, then the results of pre- 
project environmental risk assessment should become a useful baseline reference for ex post facto 
project evaluations. 
While this kind of 
screening may 
point to factors 
that decrease or 
increase the risks 
of externally- 
caused failure, it is 
certainly not an 
inoculation against 
failure. 
The decision whether or not to screen a project proposal for potential peace 
and conflict impact is related to, but very different from, the decision of 
1 
whether or not to initiate a project in a violence-prone zone in the first place. 
This latter decision requires the consideration of an additional set of risk 
factors: particularly political and logistical factors. It should be emphasized 
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that while this kind of screening may point to factors that decrease or increase 
the risks of externally-caused failure, it is certainly not an inoculation against 
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failure. Furthermore (at the risk of stating the obvious), the conditions within 
which a project is set are characteristically fluid, which means that the impact 
and ultimate success of a project is heavily dependent on its ability to 
capitalize on the opportunities as they arise, and to avoid or minimize potentially damaging 
developments. 
When considering whether to undertake or support a project in a violence prone region, it is 
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necessary to have a clear sense of the dynamics of conflict and their potential impact on the proposed 
project. Bearing in mind the discussion in Part I regarding when and where a PCIA may be 
appropriate, a preliminary review of the potential peace and conflict environment impact on a project 
might include the following, or similar, questions. 
Location: What will be the geographical extent of project? Will it be located in politically 
or legally ambiguous or contested territory? What are the positive or negative site-specific 
impacts of evolving political and security conditions nationally/locally/regionally? What are 
relations like between the community in the proposed project site and the principal decision 
makers regionally and nationally? What are the legacies of the conflict(s) in the immediate 
area of the proposed project? - for example, its impact on: the local economy; food security; 
the physical and psychological health of the community; personal in/security; availability of 
leadership; physical infrastructure; intergroup relations; women, children and vulnerable 
populations; and so on. 
Timing: At what point in the conflict will the project be undertaken - "pre"-conflict, "in"- 
conflict. (early, mid, late). or "post"-conflict phase? What has been the intensity of conflict 
in the project site? Will the project coincide with other projects in the region/country that 
might help or hinder its progress? Is it possible to identify or anticipate "external" 
political/economic/security developments that might affect the project positively or 
negatively? 
Political Context: What is the level of political support for the project locally, regionally 
and nationally? What is the nature of formal political structures conditioning relations 
between the state and civil society (authoritarian. "transitional," partially democratic; 
democratic, decentralized, participatory, corrupt, predatory), and what are their possible 
impacts? Will the project involve politically sensitive or volatile issues (directly or 
indirectly)? 
Other Salient Factors Affecting The Impact Of The Conflict on The Project: e.g.; 
institutional context; leadership; colonial legacy; cultural factors; national and international 
political economic factors such as economic infrastructure, Structural Adjustment 
Programmes, and fluctuations in commodity prices; impact of conflict on type and 
availability of resources (especially natural and human resources). 
Once these broad kinds of questions have been addressed, then a more specific set of questions may 
be developed. The section below is intended to provide a sense of the types of questions that may 
be useful in the pre-project phase. They are divided into three broad categories: 1) those that focus 
on environmental and contextual factors; 2) those that focus on project capacity; and 3) those that 
consider the degree of fit between the project and existing conditions. 
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Environmental and Contextual Considerations 
Are there minimally predictable political, legal, and security structures in place? Political, 
legal, and security structures are the most important factors affecting both the spiral into violent 
conflict, and the ability to break the cycle through development, 
peacebuilding and reconstruction. Almost by definition, these 
structures have been weakened as a result of past, festering, or 
potential violent conflict. While there will certainly be variation 
between and within countries in the functioning and competence of 
these structures (as indicated by levels of: corruption, 
disappearances, human rights abuses, militarized activity, 
professionalism, efficiency; responsiveness; constitutionality; 
transparency; etc.) there is a need for at least a minimum level of 
predictability for a project to be initiated. The level of 
predictability is related to the level of risk associated with a project. 
Different actors may have different comfort levels when it comes 
to risk. 
In terms of post-conflict 
reconstruction, it may be 
more cost-effective to get in 
early; however there is also a 
higher level of uncertainty 
and risk that violent conflict 
may reignite. On the other 
hand, delayed entrance into 
the "reconstruction game" 
may decrease the political- 
security risk, but increase 
financial costs. 
What are the infrastructural conditions? Before initiating a development project in a conflict- 
prone zone, a survey should be undertaken to assess infrastructural conditions on the ground. In 
post-conflict settings, the physical infrastructure may be heavily damaged depending on the type and 
duration of violent conflict. It is interesting, for example, to compare the impact of violence on the 
infrastructure of Rwanda and Mozambique. While there has been physical damage in both cases, 
in Mozambique there are additional costs and challenges due to the years of decay that set in during 
the war. In Rwanda, while the immediate physical damage is evident, the additional decay that 
accumulates with the years is less. The decision of any actor to get involved in either case is 
premised on an assessment of costs, risks, and infrastructural requirements. In terms of post-conflict 
reconstruction, it may be more cost-effective to get in early, however there is also a higher level of 
uncertainty and risk that violent conflict may reignite. On the other hand. delayed entrance into the 
"reconstruction game" may decrease the political-security risk, but increase financial costs.16 
Regarding logistical infrastructure, a trade-off may be required between 1) building one anew in 
order to avoid operational delays, and 2) working through and nurturing existing networks. The 
former may contribute to short term efficiency, while the latter contributes to longer term 
sustainability. The broader question here is: How will the project work within existing 
infrastructural conditions, or relatedly, how will it contribute to the development of such 
infrastructure? 
Is the opportunity structure open or closed/opening or closing? Opportunity structure is used 
here to refer to the variable conditions that affect the strategic and tactical decisions by organizations 
whether or not to initiate a project, as well as the form that project will take. It refers to the ebb and 
flow of the political, economic and social conditions that facilitate or hinder a project. Obviously, 
projects are not undertaken in a vacuum. There is a host of external factors that may have positive 
or negative impacts on a project's development, implementation and impact. Some of these factors 
may be anticipated, while others may not be. In some instances, it may well be that there are 
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positive external factors that provide the initial motivation for a project. 
South Africa is the prime example of an instance where the "opening of political space" created a 
political opportunity structure conducive to a positive peacebuilding impact. "Post-apartheid" South 
Africa" is in the midst of a complete overhaul of the institutional and policy framework that 
conditions the relationship between the state and civil society. Very rarely are the broad "rules of 
the game" - indeed the very understanding of the relationship between state and civil society - open 
for serious, far-reaching, debate and change. However, two points should be noted here. First, a 
conducive opportunity structure does not ensure the successful impact of a project. Second, while 
the conditions in South Africa may be rare, it is possible in every case to ask whether the policy 
environment is open, half-open, or closed to the policy objectives of a project. 
In those projects where the environment is not conducive, the project confronts an additional hurdle 
which requires a change of that policy environment as a prerequisite to effecting change in that 
environment. But perhaps this may be a simultaneous rather than sequential process. There are 
significant development research opportunities in those situations where the political space exists 
to amplify impact. The challenge is to be able to recognize those instances where these conditions 
exist - in advance rather than ex post facto. And if a commitment to support research is made at this 
early stage, then it is almost inevitable that the direction and questions guiding the research will shift 
as the project and conditions evolve. It is important to note here that often this is a narrow window 
of opportunity, and that it may slam shut much more quickly than it edged open. 
Project-Specific Considerations 
Does the proposed project have the right mix of the right resources? This factor overlaps 
with the others listed in this section (see also the discussion of resources above). There is no check 
list of resources that can be fashioned a priori or applied universally. Each case will need its own 
particular set of resources. The point to be emphasized here is the need to engage in these issues 
early in the discussions concerning whether or not to get involved, knowing that the required mix 
will certainly change over time in ways that are unpredictable. and that will present your project with 
both opportunities and constraints. 
Does the lead organization have experience or a comparative advantage in the region? Does 
your organization give the project a particular advantage in the field, e.g., due to its network of 
partners, or its experience in conflict-prone regions, or its unique skill set? The absence of 
experience or a comparative advantage should not automatically deter an organization from working 
in a region, however this will require a costly learning process, and significant delays in getting a 
project going in an environment which may be particularly vulnerable to destabilization in the 
absence of tangible development initiatives that may create incentives for divided communities to 
work together towards a shared set of objectives and interests. 
What are the proposed project's "tolerance levels"? What is the tolerance level (and 
institutional capacity) of your organization and project to respond to: uncertainty; project 
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indeterminacy; risk; losses (in human and material terms); set backs, incremental progress, and 
change? What contingency plans might be fashioned to avoid the avoidable, and respond to the 
unavoidable? 
Are suitable personnel available? The need for qualified personnel applies at all levels of a 
project, from the head quarters to the field - with particular emphasis on the latter. Within the 
context of development projects in conflict-prone zones, this goes well beyond the technical 
competence of administration, management, and implementation. It also includes an ability to: work 
under conditions of risk and uncertainty; monitor, interpret, and respond to changes in political and 
security landscape; negotiate and mediate between competing interests and factions in order to move 
a project towards its stated goals," and so on. These are very delicate and diplomatic skills which 
require an acute sensitivity to local level politics, the volatility of conditions, and the potential for 
a project to be destabilizing or coopted to serve the particularistic interests of one of the parties 
involved in a conflict. It requires development actors to find or create the political space within 
which to manoeuvre. At times this requires adroit negotiation with antagonists from all sides of the 
conflict. This is no mean task, but by no means is it an impossible task.19 
Correspondence Between Proposed Project and the Environment 
What is the level of political support for the proposed project? The need for political support 
applies to every level of a project. While it certainly includes the political actors in the field from 
the local, regional to national levels, it also includes political support from: 1) within one's 
organization; 2) (ideally) governmental and non-governmental actors within an organization's 
support constituency; and 3) (preferably) international organizations involved in the country. 
Does the proposed project have the trust of all authorities able to stymie your efforts? This 
factor is related to "political support" above. Trust, however, is less committal than political support. 
At a minimum, it is a reasonable expectation that authorities will not actively resist or subvert a 
project and that trust may be built incrementally as the project evolves. 
Does the proposed project have the trust, support, and participation of the community? 
Some of the factors that contribute to the development impact of a development project also 
contribute to its success in peacebuilding. The participatory character of a project is an important 
factor in explaining success in both its peacebuilding and development impact. An emphasis on 
promoting participation (as both a means and an end) in development projects generates a number 
of operating principles which have clear peacebuilding implications: 
ensuring continuity of personnel to make a learning process more feasible; 
having a network of supportive, committed persons in a variety of positions; 
avoiding partisan political involvement 
attracting and retaining the right kind of community leadership; and 
going beyond narrow conceptions of self-interest.20 
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Particularly relevant to the argument that peacebuilding requires a strong participatory dimension 
is Uphoffs observation that: "more important than knowing how much participation is occurring is 
knowing tii'ho is or is not involved in different kinds of participation. Which groups are less involved 
in different kinds of decision making. or in different kinds of implementation, or in different kinds 
of benefits, or in different kinds of evaluation? Women? Youth? Ethnic minorities? Persons living 
in remote villages? Insecure tenants? .... Is it being done at the initiatives of officials, an NGO or 
the villagers themselves? With a monetary incentive, or voluntary, or through coercion? In an 
organized manner or on an individual basis? Directly or indirectly? On a regular or ad hoc basis? 
Is the process continuous, intermittent, or sporadic? With a degree of empowerment - how much?"'-' 
Will the project be sustainable? Does it possess the ability to generate the resources necessary 
for continuation or transformation of project. Ability to weather negative political events? 
The next section of this paper turns its attention to more specific issues of PCIA. The objective here 
is provide some suggestions for how we might operationalize a tool which is effective and efficient. 
Issues of Application 
Scale of Impact 
A project may have positive or negative peacebuilding impacts at a range of levels: from the micro 
level of individuals, to the meso level of communities, to the macro level of 
countries or regions. Similarly. as discussed above, the geographic scope, Peacebuilding 
intensity, and dynamics of violent conflict may vary widely. It bears repeating means nothing if 
it is not reflected 
that peace impact is understood to include those outcomes (intentional or in positive 
unintentional) that foster and support those sustainable structures and processes changes in the 
which strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence and decrease the lived experience 
of those in, or likelihood of the outbreak reoccurrence or continuation of violent conflict , . , , 
returnin ost- to g , p ll l i i l h i h Conf ict impact s understood to nc outcomes t at ncrease t e ude a conflict zones. 
likelihood that conflict will be dealt with through violent means. 
Sources of Information on Impact 
A project may have different impacts on different groups of individuals. Thus, depending on their 
particular vantage point and experience of violence, different individuals provide different types of 
information for impact assessment. Some of the questions listed below will be more appropriate for 
some groups than others. Some may be less appropriate. The task of the PCIA is both to collect 
and, most importantly, to interpret the various pieces of the conflict puzzle as they are available in 
written form, as well as the in the experiences of those people and organizations working and living 
in conflict zones. 
Written forms of information would include: situation reports published by governmental and non- 
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governmental organisations; chronologies of conflict; local and international human rights reports; 
media reports; academic studies; and so on. Ultimately however. the primary point of reference in 
determining impact is the lived experience of those in conflict zones. Peacebuilding means nothing 
if it is not reflected in positive changes in the lived experience of those in, or returning to, conflict 
zones. For example, the demobilization of military and paramilitary organization without the 
demilitarization of society, economy, and government is difficult to cast as an unqualified 
peacebuilding success when the tensions and insecurities within and between communities remain 
unaffected. This example suggests that different groups may have different criteria - indeed, 
different understandings and expectations - concerning the means and ends of development 
initiatives in these settings. 
Indicators and Ownership 
If the PCIA is to be user-driven and relevant, then "users" should choose their own indicators - 
whether they are evaluators for multilateral organizations, or local partners, or the communities 
within which projects are undertaken.'-'- This goes against the grain of most conventional approaches 
to evaluation, which typically specify indicators in advance. However, conventional evaluations 
focus more clearly on a project or programme in a certain sector. Ostensibly, this approach has the 
advantagallowing for greater comparability between projects by identifying and standardizing 
suitable indicators within projects. There is a danger however, that the a priori identification of 
indicators may obscure as much as it reveals by highlighting (and thus legitimating) some features 
of a project, while simultaneously burying (and thus delegitimating) others. 
The demobilization of 
military and paramilitary 
organizations without the 
demilitarization of society, 
economy, and government 
is difficult to cast as an 
1unqualified peacebuilding 
success. 
The a priori identification of indicators may say more about the 
evaluation or assessment system than it does about the project itself. 
The use of a variety of indicators allows for the development of a 
kaleidoscopic approach which is able not only to accommodate 
different assessments of a project's impact, but to accept that 
different assessments may be a function of the very different realities 
of different groups. "If the audience changes, so can the facts and the 
truths." 3 
This approach helps to avoid the imposition of a reality by an outsider which may not correspond 
to the realities of those groups and individuals within the ambit of the project. For example, Ernest 
House notes correctly that "in an evaluation, the director of a project may present one view of the 
project, while the teacher working in it may present quite a different view. These two view points 
are not logically contradictory since both may be true as viewed from different circumstances.`4 
Furthermore, by loosening the shackles of pre-specified indicators, the space is created within the 
impact assessment process to allow different "stakeholders" to shape the framework to suit their 
specific needs; to assert ownership over the evaluation/assessment process; and to make more 
transparent the values and judgments inherent in all evaluations, and to thereby open the way for 
discussion and exploration of different (and sometimes competing) interpretations of impact. 
Bearing these caveats in mind, it is possible to identify a host of indicators employed to assess 
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governance and human rights projects. They may, or may not, be available or useful in different 
cases, however they may serve as a helpful point of reference. 
Security Indicators: conflict-related deaths or injuries; disappearances; incidence of human 
rights abuses, including rape, sexual torture and violations of children's rights; number of 
riots or similar instances of uncontrolled expressions of dissent; demonstrations; number of 
internally displaced people; outflow of refugees; rate and patterns of repatriation; ratio of 
GNP spent on social welfare to military matters; arrests or detention without probable cause 
or warrent; incommunicado detention; cruel, unusual, or degrading treatment; inhumane 
prison conditions. 
Psychological Indicators: perceptions of individual and collective security; perceptions of 
other groups; level of tolerance to cultural or political differences. 
Social Indicators: freedom of thought, belief and religion; level and type of social 
interaction between and within groups; change in the level of intermarriage; desegregated 
education; political representation; family reunification; number of multicommunal or cross- 
cutting social organizations; level of economic or employment discrimination; freedom of 
speech; freedom of the media. 
Political Indicators: level and type of public participation; presence or absence of multi- 
communal political parties; fair and free elections; levels of emergency rule in parts or all 
of the country; freedom of movement; public participation or influence on the policy making 
process. 
Judicial Indicators: constitutional protection of individual rights; guarantees of due process; 
human rights legislation; judicial freedom from political interference; equality under the 
law; prosecution of criminals. 
Because such indicators are drawn from the human rights and governance fields, they tend to 
emphasize the legal dimensions of peacebuilding. There is much more work to be done with 
communities to identify more innovative indicators that may be culturally and site specific. For 
example, there have been a number of calls to formulate conflict prevention indicators analogous to 
those employed in the public health and epidemiology.25 There have also been suggestions that just 
as infant mortality rates are sensitive indicators of the general health of a population, perhaps the 
conditions of women, children and the most vulnerable in society might serve as the functional 
equivalent of "sentinel health indicators." 
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PART III: POST-PROJECT CONSIDERATIONS 
Impacts 
What types of impacts might we see as a result of undertaking development interventions in 
environments of potential or open conflict? Where would we look to find them? A number of 
illustrative suggestions are listed below. 
A substantial or politically significant change in access to individual or collective resources 
(broadly defined), especially non-renewable resources 
This would include access to basic resources such as water, land, and food. However, it would also 
include political resources. Norman Uphoff provides a useful basis for conceptualizing and 
operationalizing political resources which includes the following resource categories: economic 
resources, social status, information, force, legitimacy, and authority. The utility of his approach is 
that it incorporates both material and non-material resources within a single analytical framework 
of resource-exchange in a way which may be usefully applied to peace and conflict impact 
assessemem.t Given the centrality of identity and "ethnic" issues in many of the recent conflicts, 
it is important to also include cultural resources on this list, i.e., those resources enable a group to 
articulate its cultural identity.27 
Creation or exacerbation of socio-economic tensions 
This would include a wide range of possibilities, from education projects which are perceived to 
privilege one group over another, to small loans and income generation projects which challenge the 
existing socio-economic status quo, to agricultural projects which reduce farmer dependency on land 
owners or input providers. Since most successful development initiatives create or exacerbate 
socio-economic tensions by challenging the status quo, the point here is simply to stress that when 
this impact is likely to be present and significant, and when other any of the factors listed here are 
also anticipated, then serious consideration must be given to undertaking a PC1A. 
A substantial change in the material basis of economic sustenance or food security 
This might include, for example, the introduction of a new plant type, agricultural technique or 
technology which alters the political economy of farming in a region in a way which marginalizes 
those whose economic livelihood is dependent upon the old way of doing things. It would also 
include development programmes which are tied implicitly or explicitly to the liberalization of the 
economy in ways which are driven by the macro-economic logic of restructuring to the neglect of 
their detrimental impact on economic sustenance and food security at meso- and micro-levels. 
Natsios provides an interesting peacebuilding example in Somalia based on a report by Fred Cuny 
which recognized that the merchant class was actually encouraging the violence and looting because 
their regular supplies of agricultural goods for their markets had been destroyed by the drought and 
clan conflict. Thus, he persuaded a number of development agencies to implement monetization 
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programmes which involved selling food aid to these merchants on a regular basis at stable prices 
in order to reduce their dependence on looted supplies, and to return merchants to their traditional 
role as self-interested defenders of law and order seeking the stability necessary for regularized 
commercial activity. The projects were intended to encourage merchants to apply pressure on the 
militias to limit their disruption, and to cut off a source of funding to the militias who used the 
merchants' payments to purchase more weapons.' 
Exacerbation of conflict by challenging the content of, or control over, existing political, 
economic, or social systems 
To the extent that a development project empowers individuals and groups to assert control over the 
political, economic, and social aspects of their lives, then it may challenge existing systems of 
control and give rise to the use of violence either in defence of the status quo, or in opposition to 
it. However, it is equally important to highlight the inverse case: projects which fail to challenge 
unjust, structures and practices of political, economic, and social control may, in effect, subsidize 
1) their implicit and explicit violence, and 2) the political regimes that benefit from them. In other 
words, we may exacerbate violent conflict by failing to challenge the content of, or control over, 
such structures and practices. While this argument would certainly apply to any of the kleptocracies 
currently existing within the international state system, interesting arguments have been made to 
consider South Africa in this context; in particular the extensive legacy of apartheid within the 
present political, bureaucratic, administrative, and economic reality of the so-called "new political 
dispensation." 
One fascinating IDRC-supported project demonstrated that much of the violence, particularly within 
the black communities (during and "after" apartheid), was the result of competition over basic 
material resources - housing, employment and so on.2' The project argued (and subsequently 
demonstrated) that the inequity and conflict engendered in the structures and processes of apartheid 
are increasingly perpetuated through the sharpening differentiation and alienation based on class 
rather than race. Thus, there is a danger that the inequities and injustices engendered by the social, 
political and economic institutions of apartheid, may be perpetuated by post-apartheid institutions. 
The only difference would be that the axis of confrontation/violence and inequity would be class, 
rather than race. The failure to recognize this may well mean the failure of the post-apartheid regime 
to overcome its past. 
PART IV: FIVE AREAS OF POTENTIAL PEACE AND CONFLICT IMPACT 
Asking the Right Questions and Looking in the Right Places 
The final section of this paper turns its attention to more specific issues of PCIA. The primary 
objective is to provide an example of a framework that might help us to look in the right places and 
to ask the right questions about the peace and conflict impact of development initiatives. It seeks 
to develop a concrete point of reference to help stimulate and focus the discussion of development 
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actors who might use a PCIA. To do this, it presents a series of questions that might be asked of 
projects or project proposals to establish a sense of past or potential impact on peace and conflict 
conditions. The questions are structured around the five areas of potential impact introduced above 
and shown in Figure 1. 
It should be emphasized that the questions in the next section are intended to convey a sense of the 
types of questions that might be asked. The are certainly not comprehensive, but intended to provide 
a spur to discussion. Indeed, given the variety of projects with a potential peacebuilding impact, 
each project should elicit its own set of situation-specific questions. This is not to say that it would 
not be possible to compare assessments across cases. However, while the broad parameters will be 
comparable, the specifics of impact will vary according to context and nature of project. 
Figure 1: Five Areas of Potential Peace and Conflict Impact 
POTENTIAL 
PEACE & EXAMPLES 
CONFLICT 
IMPACT AREAS 
Institutional Capacity to Impact on capacity to identify and respond to peace and conflict challenges and 
Manage/Resolve opportunities; organizational responsiveness; bureaucratic flexibility; efficiency and 
Violent Conflict & to effectiveness; ability to modify institutional roles and expectations to suit changing 
Promote Tolerance environment and needs; financial 
and Build Peace management. 
Direct and indirect impact on: the level, intensity, dynamics of violence; violent 
Military and Human behaviour; in/security (broadly defined); defence/security policy; repatriation, 
Security demobilization and reintegration; reform and retraining of police and security 
forces/structures; disarmament; banditry; organized crime. 
Impact on formal and informal political structures and processes, such as: government 
Political Structures and capabilities from the level of the state government down to the municipality; policy 
Processes content and efficacy; decentralization/concentration of power; political ethnicization; 
representation; transparency; accountability; democratic culture; dialogue; conflict 
mediation and reconciliation; strengthening/weakening civil society actors; political 
mobilization. Impact on rule of law; independence/politicization of legal system; human 
rights conditions; labour standards. 
Impact on strengthening or weakening equitable socio-economic structures/processes; 
Economic Structures distortion/conversion of war economies; impact on economic infrastructure; supply of 
and basic goods; availability of investment capital; banking system; employment impact; 
Processes productivity; training; income generation; production of commercial product or service; 
food in/security; Impacts on the exploitation, generation, or distribution of resources, 
esp. non-renewable resources and the material basis of economic sustenance or food 
security. 
Impact on: quality of life; constructive social communication (e.g., those promoting 
Social Reconstruction tolerance, inclusiveness and participatory principles); displaced people; in/adequacy of 
and health care and social services; in/compatibility of interests; dis/trust; inter-group 
Empowerment hostility/dialogue; communications; transport); resettlement/displacement; housing; 
education; nurturing a culture of peace. 
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Institutional Capacity to Manage/Resolve Violent Conflict & to Promote Tolerance 
and Build Peace 
Impact on capacity to identify and respond to peace and conflict challenges and 
opportunities; organizational responsiveness; bureaucratic flexibility; efficiency and 
effectiveness; ability to modify institutional roles and expectations to suit changing 
environment and needs; financial management. 
Sample Questions 
Did/will the project affect organizational capacity of individuals, or collectivities 
(institutions, social groups, private sector) - positively or negatively- to identify and respond 
to peace and conflict challenges and opportunities? If so, Which groups? To what degree? 
How and why? Did/will the project increase or decrease the capacity to imagine, articulate 
and operationalize realities that nurture rather than inhibit peace? 
"Organization capacity" might include: 1) the ability to conceptualize and identify 
peacebuilding challenges and opportunities; 2) in the case of organizations, to restructure 
itself to respond; and 3) to alter standard operational procedures to respond more 
effectively and efficiently in ways that have a tangible positive impact on the ground - for 
example, in ways that enhance fairness, equity, "evenhandedness,"30 and accountability, and 
transparency. 
What were/might be the obstacles to a positive peacebuilding impact? 
How might the beneficial effects be amplified/made more sustainable both during and 
following the project.? 
Military and Human Security 
Direct and indirect impact on: the level, intensity, dynamics of violence; violent 
behaviour; in/security (broadly defined) - in particular as experinced in the daily lives 
of the general population; defence/security policy; repatriation, demobilization and 
reintegration; reform and retraining of police and security forces/structures; 
disarmament; banditry; organized crime. 
Sample Questions 
'> Did/will the project affect the individual's sense of security? 
r> Did/will the project affect the military/paramilitary/criminal environment - directly or 
directly. positively or negatively? If so how? 
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Was there/will there be tangible improvements in the political, economic, physical, food, 
security? If so, what are they, and to whom do they apply? If so, Which groups? To what 
degree? How and why? 
Did/will the project deepen our understanding, or increase the capacity to address the non- 
military irritants to violent conflict - e.g., environmental degradation, resources scarcity, 
political manipulation, disinformation, mobilization and politicization of identity, etc.? 
To what extent did/will the project contribute to the "demilitarization of minds"? For 
example, through the dismantling of the cultural and socio-psychological predisposition of 
individuals and groups to use militarized violence as a first, rather than last, resort. More 
generally, how was/might be the impact of the project on: 1) the decreased prominence of 
military weapons in social, political, and economic life; 2) the gradual delegitimation of a 
gun culture; and 3) the evolution of non-violent modalities of conflict management. 
Political Structures and Processes 
}I act on formal and informal political structures and processes, such as: 
government capabilities from the level of the state government down to the 
municipality; policy content and efficacy; decentralization/concentration of power; 
political ethnicization; representation; transparency; accountability; democratic 
culture; dialogue; conflict mediation and reconciliation; strengthening/weakening 
civil society actors; political mobilization. Impact on rule of law; 
independence/politicization of legal system; human rights conditions; labour 
standards. 
Sample Questions 
Did/will the project help or hinder the consolidation of constructive political relationships 
within and between state and civil society? For example, how did/will the project affect the 
understanding, composition and distribution of political resources within and between state 
and civil society? 
Did/will the project have an positive or negative impact on formal or informal political 
structures and processes - either within the formal arena of institutionalized state politics 
(e.g., constitutional or party politics) or within the informal arena of civil society (e.g., 
traditional authority structures)? If so, how? Did/will the project contribute to the 
development of the capacity of individuals/collectivities to participate constructively in 
democratic political processes? Did/will it contribute to increasing the transparency, 
accountability, representativeness, and appropriateness of political structures? 
L1.> Did/will the project influence policy processes or products? If so, in what ways? 
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Did/will the project help defuse inter-group tensions? If so, how? 
What was/what will be the impact of the project on human rights conditions within a country 
or region? (e.g., awareness, legislation, levels of abuse/respect?) 
Economic Structures and Processes 
Impact on strengthening or weakening equitable socio-economic 
structures/processes; distortion/conversion of war economies; impact on economic 
infrastructure; supply of basic goods; availability of investment capital; banking 
system; employment impact; productivity; training; income generation; production 
of commercial product or service; food in/security; Impacts on the exploitation, 
generation, or distribution of resources, esp. non-renewable resources and the 
material basis of economic sustenance or food security 
Inevitably, protracted militarized conflict distorts the economy of afflicted regions. It subsidizes 
inequitable and inefficient socio-economic structures, creates "war economies," stifles and distorts 
production, and wastes scarce resources in non-productive war-related expenditures. At the level 
of the individual, the economic impact of such conflicts is profound and near incalculable. In the 
wake of a conflict, a war-devastated economy hinders PBR, and risks pushing parties into the spiral 
of violence particularly where conflict over the production and distribution of resources was an 
underpinning factor in initiating and perpetuating violence. The lack of economic opportunity is a 
particular threat in cases where the immediate post-conflict phase is populated by "former" - yet still 
armed - combatants. An assault rifle may symbolize protection, power, and status in a conflict zone, 
but in the post-conflict period, it also represents economic sustenance in those areas where there are 
no economic alternatives. 
Sample Questions 
To what extent did/will a project contribute to or detract from efforts to "re"-construct 
damaged economic and social infrastructure? Specifically, in the following areas: 
*high level of debt; 
*unsustainable high military budgets; 
*skewed distribution of wealth, income, and assets; 
*resettlement of displaced populations 
*environmental degradation - particularly that which inhibits economic productivity 
To what extent did/will the project:'' 
*assess damage to social and economic infrastructure; 
*provide technical assistance for rehabilitation and reconstruction; 
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*rehabilitate and reconstruct economic infrastructure; 
*reactivate smallholder agriculture; 
*rehabilitate the export sector; 
*rehabilitate key industries; 
*up-grade employment skills; 
*stabilize the national currency and; 
*rehabilitate financial institutions 
Social Reconstruction and Empowerment 
'Impact on: quality of life; constructive social communication (e.g., those promoting 
tolerance, inclusiveness and participatory principles); displaced people; in/adequacy 
of health care and social services; in/compatibility of interests; dis/trust; inter-group 
hostility/dialogue; communications; transport); resettlement/displacement; housing; 
education; nurturing a culture of peace. 
Sample Questions 
Did/will the project contribute to the development or consolidation of equity and justice, or 
the means of providing basic needs? 
Did/will the benefits of the project get shared equitably? 
Did/will the project include members from the various communities affected by the conflict? 
How? effectiveness? Criteria for effectiveness? 
Did/will the project seek explicitly to benefit or build bridges between the different 
communities? If so, how? Effectiveness? Criteria of effectiveness? Did/will it help foster 
an inclusive - rather than exclusive - sense of community? Did/will it facilitate the ability 
of individuals and groups to work together for the mutual benefit? 
Did/will the project facilitate positive communication/interaction between and within 
groups? Is this sustainable? 
Did/Will it provide/generate the skills, tools, capacity for individuals and communities to 
define issues/problems to be addressed, formulate solutions to those problems, or resolve 
those self-defined problems? 
Did/will the project take into consideration the the history/legacy of conflict in its design? 
For example, did/will it consider the specific impact on children, women and other 
vulnerable groups such as displaced populations, and the politically, socially and 
economically marginalized. 
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Did/will the project increase contact, confidence, or trust between the communities? Did it 
dispel distrust? Did/will it create common interests, or encourage individuals and groups to 
recognize their common interests, and did/will modify their behaviour in order to attain 
them? 
To what extend did/will the project incorporate/privilege the views and interests of affected 
indigenous populations? 
CONCLUSION 
In some ways, this paper is winding down at the point it should be picking up. The reasons for this 
are related to the rationale for circulating this study as a Working Paper. First, if a PCIA tool is to 
be useful, it will have to be the product of the interaction and synergies of the full spectrum of the 
peacebuilding community. The space has been left open to allow for and encourage the discussion 
needed to fashion a genuinely collective tool. The next stage in its development will be the most 
important. Second, if the argument for the need to integrate peace and conflict issues into 
mainstream development work is to stand a chance conceptually and programmatically, then it will 
first need to make a convincing case for its necessity and its utility. This is one of the objectives of 
this paper. Once this has been done, the challenge is one of practicality. What might work? What 
is needed? What are the institutional and field opportunities and constraints conditioning the use of 
such a tool. and so on. Third, and perhaps most problematically, as discussed in Part I, Section B, 
it may be that the best we can hope for is a helpful interpretive tool, rather than a large scale map. 
These are open questions. 
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APPENDIX: The Basics 
Peacebuilding: In the broadest sense, peacebuilding refers to those initiatives which foster and 
support sustainable structures and processes which strengthen the prospects for peaceful coexistence 
and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence, or continuation, of violent conflict. This 
process typically contains both immediate and longer term objectives, for example, humanitarian 
objectives as well as political, economic, and social objectives. It should be underscored that 
peacebuilding is not about the imposition of "solutions," it is about the creation of opportunities, and 
the creation of political, economic, and social spaces, within which indigenous actors can identify, 
develop, and employ the resources necessary to build a peaceful, prosperous, and just society.'- 
Peacebuilding is a two-fold process requiring both the deconstruction of the structures of violence 
and the construction of the structures of peace. 
Peace Impact: The term peace impact is understood to include those outcomes that foster and 
support those sustainable structures and processes which strengthen the prospects for peaceful 
coexistence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence, or continuation, of violent 
conflict. "Peace" is not the absence of conflict, but the absence of the use of violence to resolve both 
the positive and negative forms of conflict that arise naturally in any society. (See "Conflict" 
below). 
Conflict Impact: The term conflict impact is understood to include all outcomes that increase the 
likelihood that conflict will be dealt with through violent means. 
Peacebuilding-as-Impact: Over the last 24 months or so, there has been considerable discussion 
in Canada and internationally of how to nurture "peacebuilding" processes in conflict and "post- 
conflict" environments. These discussions, and the initiatives they spawned, have been assessed 
elsewhere." What needs to be noted in the current context is the overwhelming tendency to treat 
peacebuilding as a very narrow set of activities that focuses on the transformation of formal political 
and legal institutions. It is essential that we recognize that peacebuilding is not a specific activity, 
but an impact, function, or consequence of an activity. Not all development work is "peacebuilding 
work." Indeed, as discussed below, "development" by its very nature is destabilizing - for better or 
for worse. While some "Peacebuilding and Reconstruction (PBR) Projects" may be characterized 
by their explicit peacebuilding objectives such as the transformation of political and legal structures, 
we should be careful not to limit peacebuilding thinking and initiatives to "democratic development," 
human rights, and institution strengthening. As international actors jump aboard the peacebuilding 
bandwagon, there is a danger that we may ghettoize peacebuilding work by restricting our 
understanding to those more overtly political projects while neglecting the constructive impact of 
"conventional" development projects in violence-prone regions, including projects in public health, 
water, sanitation, communications, and so on. Since the bulk of development work will be in the 
areas of "conventional" development, the greatest peacebuilding impact (positive and negative) will 
come not from narrowly defined "PBR projects" but from these "mainstream" initiatives. 
Realistically, development activities alone cannot resolve the protracted militarized conflicts which 
are so prevalent in the world today. However, they possess the potential to contribute significantly 
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to conflict management and peacebuilding. As importantly. their activities have the potential to 
exacerbate tensions and inhibit conflict management.' The capacity of development actors to 
influence such events must be evaluated carefully since it varies considerably from case to case. 
Reconstruction: Although the term "reconstruction" is used widely, it is a misnomer. The 
objective of post-conflict activities is rarely a return to the status quo ante bellum, since pre-war 
conditions typically contain the antecedents to subsequent violent conflict. Rather, "reconstruction" 
refers to the creation of new, sustainable, institutions which are more democratic, fair and responsive 
to the needs, concerns, and aspirations of an entire population - e.g., effective political structures 
and processes which protect and advance the well-being of the citizenry, institutions which ensure 
human security, and robust economic, judicial and social institutions. 
Conflict: Conflict is not seen to be a necessarily negative or destructive phenomenon in this study. 
In essence, development is inevitably conflictual, destabilizing, and subversive because it challenges 
established economic, social, or political power structures which inhibit individuals and groups from 
pursuing their full potential. However, there is a need to maintain a clear distinction between violent 
and non-violent conflict. While this study focusses more on violent, rather than non-violent conflict, 
it has a special interest in those liminal moments at which non-violent conflict "turns" ("re-turns") 
violent and is militarized. This study views the presence or absence of conflict mediating 
mechanisms and institutions'` to be central factors influencing whether a conflict passes the 
threshold into violence - this might include representative political systems, a transparent and fair 
judicial system, an equitable social system, and so on. Some have argued that violent conflict is the 
ultimate expression of the breakdown of a society's systems of governance, and that reconstruction 
therefore rests primarily upon the renegotiation and refashioning of new systems of governance at 
the community, sub-national and national level.36 Thus, "reconstruction" requires strategies and 
interventions to promote institutional arrangements that can facilitate and sustain the transition from 
violent conflict to sustainable development. An appealing feature of this kind of approach is the way 
its analysis of the problem is tied directly to an understanding of the nature of solutions. 
Despite an emphasis on the institutional dimensions of violence and peacebuilding, this study also 
appreciates the variations of, and the connections/disconnections between, different manifestations 
and types of violence. It is, for example. disturbed by the tendency to disconnect the "political," 
structural, violence of the apartheid past from the "criminal" violence of the "post"-apartheid South 
Africa present. The danger of this disconnection (conceptually and pragmatically) is two-fold: 1) 
it inhibits us from examining the relationships between "political" and "criminal" violence, the 
legacy of apartheid, and the full nature of contemporary violence in South Africa; and 2) it tends to 
limit the scope of our responses to the legal-policing realm, rather than the socio-economic-political 
realm. If the source of the contemporary violence is political, social, or economic, then a rigid legal- 
policing response will be as problematic in the post-apartheid transition as it was during apartheid. 
The common argument in South Africa is that the removal of the violence-dampening institutions 
of apartheid "led" to the current explosion in violent crime. However, this argument uses the term 
"violence" in a very narrow and conservative way. It makes sense to recognize the structural 
violence inflicted upon South Africans in the form of poverty, infant mortality, stifled advancement. 
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etcetera. If we accept that the term violence may have a variety of meanings and manifestations. 
then we can begin to see that the post-apartheid era reveals not so much a rise in violence, as a 
change in the type of violence characterizing social, political, and economic relations. 
Contemporary manifestations of violence in South Africa are not sui generis. They follow the 
trajectory of societal and political developments in the country. An understanding of the present 
requires a consideration of its linkages to the recent and distant past. The implication for the 
development of a PCIA is that it underscores the need to peel away the multiple layers of violence 
to build a sense of its dynamics, history, and trajectory. 
Paradoxically, the experiences of violent conflict may generate new development opportunities and 
ways of working. The experiences of Zimbabwe, Nicaragua, Eritrea, Somaliland, and South Africa 
suggest that violent conflict may serve as the anvil upon which new and progressive social and 
economic structures, political solutions, and development opportunities may be formed. This 
particular point was underscored in the Eritrea case study of the War-Torn Societies Project (WSP) 
of the LTN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), when the Eritrean partners stated 
emphatically that their society was war-born, not war-torn. 
It is apprate to conclude this section with a note on the legitimacy of using force to affect change. 
There are many ways to change economic, social, and political structures - implicit or explicit violent 
modalities are certainly included within the menu of options (e.g., support for armed resistence, the 
threat or use of militarized force, and so on). Under some conditions such violence may be required 
to affect change. However, this option cannot be legitimate within a developmental approach to 
change. The application of violence might be justified using consequentialist logic (the ends justify 
the means), but it cannot be justified or legitimatized using developmental logic.'' Furthermore, 
violence is a particularly blunt instrument that: 1) is prone to generating unanticipated, unintended, 
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